Iraq PM Sudani’s Fight for a Second Term: What’s Blocking His Re-Election?

 

Note:  Different news sites are providing different reports, so we gathered the information from the major sites and this is what we learned. 

Who is Mohammed Shia al-Sudani

Mohammed Shia al-Sudani became prime minister of Iraq in 2022, nominated by the big Shiite-led political alliance Coordination Framework (CF). (Wikipedia)

In May 2025, he formed a new electoral alliance, Reconstruction and Development Coalition, to contest the November 2025 parliamentary vote — a move aimed at securing a second term in office under his own banner. (Wikipedia)

What he has achieved — and why he seems a frontrunner

• In the November 2025 elections, his Reconstruction and Development Coalition won more seats than any other single group, making it the largest bloc. (Al Jazeera)

• His platform emphasized improving basic services (roads, infrastructure, hiring, state jobs), rebuilding after years of instability, and balancing Iraq’s foreign relations — with both the United States and neighboring powers. (Arab News)

• Many ordinary Iraqis reportedly saw him as a “stabilizing” figure, capable of delivering jobs, rebuilding infrastructure, and offering some measure of security and consistency after decades of turbulence. (Arab News)

Because of these factors, many analysts at first considered al-Sudani a strong contender for a second term. (Reuters)

But — the road to a second term is full of obstacles

Despite his apparent electoral success and visible achievements, al-Sudani is encountering strong resistance and structural political barriers that make a second term far from certain. The main obstacles include:

1. Fragmented Parliament — no majority, many blocs

• Iraq’s parliament has 329 seats. No single party or alliance has enough seats to govern alone; forming a government requires broad coalitions. (Reuters)

• While his coalition came first with 46 seats, that is far short of the 60–70 seats many analysts say are needed to strongly push for the premiership. (The National)

• That means to become prime minister again, al-Sudani will need to build alliances — sometimes with parties or factions who distrust him. (Arab Center Washington DC)

2. Opposition from within his own base (Shiite rivals)

• Several factions within the Coordination Framework are reportedly against a second term for al-Sudani. Some prefer a “non-partisan” prime minister — someone without a strong partisan bloc — whom they believe will be easier to influence or control. (The New Arab)

• Some armed and political figures tied to Iran-backed militias appear to fear that a repeat of a powerful, networked prime minister (as happened under past leaders) could threaten their influence in the state. (The National)

• For them, granting power to someone with a strong political base and public popularity is risky: it could centralize too much power in the premiership and disrupt their control over institutions or patronage networks. (The National)

3. A fragile electoral alliance — success not guaranteed to translate into long-term loyalty

• The Reconstruction and Development Coalition is not a deeply-rooted traditional party. It is a loose coalition of diverse political forces — ministers, tribal leaders, independents, defectors. (Al Jazeera)

• Many of those members reportedly joined more for convenience than conviction. Analysts warn that once the election is over, these alliances may dissolve, meaning his parliamentary strength could shrink just when negotiating for the premiership. (Al Jazeera)

• In effect, while the coalition helped him win more seats, it may not guarantee coherent or lasting support — making it risky for other blocs to back him confidently. (Al Jazeera)

4. Distrust about centralizing too much power — historical baggage

• Many in the Iraqi political class — especially among Shiite parties — are wary of giving a single individual too much power. Their concern: a strong prime minister with a personal power base could evolve into a “deep state” actor, undermining checks and balances. (The National)

• The fear is informed by past experience: previous leaders whose second terms allowed them to accumulate influence across security, economic, and political institutions — often to the detriment of pluralistic governance. (The National)

• As a result, many factions prefer a PM who is more of a caretaker — someone without a strong bloc or political ambitions — which works against al-Sudani’s candidacy. (The New Arab)

5. Need for broad support beyond Shiite blocs — Kurdish and Sunni factions matter too

• Even though the Shiite bloc dominates, forming a government usually requires backing from Kurdish and Sunni parties — whose support is not guaranteed for al-Sudani. (The National)

• Those groups often have their own priorities (constitutional rights, regional autonomy, representation) and may resist supporting a second-term PM if they believe he may favor Shiite-dominated central power or ignore minority demands. (The National)

What this means: Why “coming first” doesn’t equal “staying in power”

Although al-Sudani’s coalition won the most seats in the recent elections, that is only the beginning. Because of Iraq’s deeply fragmented political landscape and the need for cross-sectarian alliances, his path to a second term depends not just on votes — but on intricate negotiations, balancing rivalries within his own bloc, and overcoming distrust among other factions.

In short: He won the vote — but he has not yet won the power. Many of the same dynamics that allowed him to rise — shifting alliances, weak institutional checks, influence of armed groups — now work against him as parties scramble to re-set the balance before al-Sudani can consolidate another term.

As one analyst put it: because many inside his own camp fear an over-centralized premiership, they may prefer a more controllable, less autonomous candidate — even if that person has less public support. (The National)