Iran could attack Iraq beginning September 19th Here's why

As the Sept. 19 deadline set by Tehran for action against its exiled Kurdish opponents approaches, concerns arise as to how much of any agreement that was made between Tehran and Baghdad regarding disarmament and relocation will be followed through with. Iraqi Kurdistan authorities fear that this deal could create further instability in their autonomy and place in the regional geopolitical landscape.

In March, the then-secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani and his Iraqi counterpart Qasim Al-Araji in Baghdad signed an agreement to secure the border between Iran and Iraq. Iranian Kurdish opposition parties in Kurdistan were primarily a target of the agreement.

Nasser Kanani, a spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, spoke to journalists in Tehran on Aug. 28 and said Iraqi leaders had promised to take measures such as disarming terrorist and separatist militias and terminating their bases by Sept. 19. He specified that the agreement has been communicated to Iraqi Kurdish officials clearly and affirmed that this timeline would not be extended. Formerly, Iranian forces have threatened attacks against enemies of the Islamic Republic located in Iraq's Kurdistan region if no action is taken.

In response to Kanani's remarks, Iraqi government spokesperson Basim Al-Awadi said Baghdad had fulfilled its obligations under the Iranian security agreement. He said that militants should not be infiltrated, wanted persons should be extradited, and armed groups should be disarmed and removed from camps.

In accordance with Fariba Mohammadi, a spokesperson for the Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan (Komalay Zehmetkeshan), there is pressure for the organization's armed forces based in mountainous areas to relocate. However, she also told Amwaj Media that there was no discussion about members of the group and their families who reside in camps in Iraqi Kurdistan. Mohammedi insisted that her group would not accept being disarmed.

Six different Iranian Kurdish political groups have established a presence in Iraq's Kurdistan region.

These include the Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan, as well as the Society of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan (Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, led by Abdollah Mohtadi), the Komala Organization of the Iranian Communist Party (led by Seyed Ibrahim Alizadeh), the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI, headed by Mustafa Hijri), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK, led by Hussein Yazdanpanah) and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK, co-led by Siamand Moeini and Zilan Vejin). Many were forced to flee into exile in Iraq due to their conflict with Iran’s government that does not support autonomous Kurdish rights within its borders.

Although Iranian Kurdish groups are aligned with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey, Iraqi Kurdish authorities have some influence over Iranian Kurdish groups. In Iraqi Kurdistan, officials are in a difficult position as a result of Tehran's threats and pressures. The refusal to meet Iran's demands could result in Tehran or its allies in Baghdad resuming attacks on Iranian Kurdish groups in Kurdistan.

In contrast, meeting Tehran's conditions- particularly on disarming Kurdish opposition parties runs the risk of provoking confrontation between KRG forces and such groups.

In addition, Lawk Ghafouri, a political analyst, explained that disarming Iranian Kurdish parties would be highly unpopular among Iraqi Kurdish authorities.

A senior military official from the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), demonstrating an understanding of the KRG's dilemma, told Amwaj Media that while his group would never disarm, it might consider moving its forces from one "highland area" of Iraqi Kurdistan to another, but not to the plains or urban areas.

Iran's first anniversary of nationwide anti-establishment protests is just around the corner, and Iranian Kurds believe Tehran's pressure is mainly motivated by fears of a resurgence of unrest.

Last September, Iran was plunged into protests following the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in the custody of morality police. The state propaganda mainly sought to present the demonstrations—which originally began in Kurdish territories—as part of a foreign scheme backed by opposition groups based outside of Iran's borders. Such assertions were strongly denied by these Kurdish entities. In response to this, Iran sent military forces to Kurdish regions and bombarded outposts belonging to Iranian Kurdish dissidents situated in Iraqi Kurdistan, utilizing missiles and drones on multiple occasions.

The Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan's Mohtadi stated on Aug. 28 that his group's forces were operating in Iraqi Kurdistan in a defensive capacity and had not attacked Iranian government forces since the late 1980s truce.

Since the protests sparked by Amini’s death, Iran has employed a combination of rewards and punishments in its dealings with Iraqi Kurds, apparently in an effort to create divisions among them. Despite the lack of drone and missile attacks this year, it has been alleged that Iranian agents have been responsible for several assassinations of Iraqi Kurdish activists in Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, Tehran has since late last year worked hard to fortify commercial connections - a path that has been met with great enthusiasm from the KRG - while Iraqi Kurdish leaders have tried to cultivate better ties with Iran by encouraging tens of thousands of pilgrims coming into Iraq for Arbaeen, winning praise from the Iranian government.

Peshawa Hawramani, a KRG spokesperson, told Amwaj Media that Iraqi Kurdish authorities do not wish to become involved in the "problems" between the Islamic Republic and its Kurdish opposition.

Hawramani declared that the Iraqi Kurdistan region should not be a battleground between countries nor used as a site for assaults against nearby countries. Furthermore, he highlighted the need for conversation between Iran and its Kurdish antagonists while calling on Baghdad to uphold its sovereignty when facing risks from foreign nations. Turkey's regular bombardment of alleged PKK locations is particularly noteworthy.

Iraqi Kurds, however, face a double-edged sword when it comes to sovereignty. Baghdad seems to be taking advantage of Iran's threats to impose its sovereignty on Kurdistan, undermining the decades of Kurdish self-rule that have been in place since 1991, when the Kurds rebelled against Saddam Hussein's regime (1979-2003).

Hawramani voiced caution over Baghdad and Tehran's intentions, suggesting that the KRG Peshmerga forces and Kurdish members of the Iraqi border guards should spearhead the mission to secure borders and avoid contact between Iranian Kurdistan parties and Iran's troops. The KRG would prefer to empower local forces integrated into Iraq's military apparatus by assigning them the responsibility of defending Iraqi Kurdistan on its borders with Iran, Syria, and Turkey. It is unclear whether Baghdad and Erbil agreed upon the recruitment of up to 3,000 locals as part of the Iraqi border guard team or independently coordinated by Iraqi authorities.

A key consideration for Kurds is the broader geopolitical repercussions of the Iranian-Iraq security agreement. Iraqi state elements with close ties to Iran have been taking steps to weaken the KRG and strip it of key power levers, including oil exports and financial management, under Iranian pressure on Iraqi-Kurdish authorities. As a result, Iraqi Kurds interpret Iran's saber-rattling through the lens of larger geopolitical rivalries.

In this situation, there is apprehension that Tehran might convince Baghdad to send in the Iraqi army or the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) to Iraqi Kurdistan, which could prohibit any meaningful autonomy for the KRG. Nonetheless, Iranian Kurdish groups present a chance for the KRG to upsurge their power in the regional geopolitical realm, and even though these organizations pose a risk and are exposed to danger, it is an opportunity that must not be disregarded.

For a long time, such [Iranian Kurdish] forces have contributed to the development of Kurdistan as an autonomous regional player. According to Kamaran Palani, a professor of international relations at Salahaddin University in Erbil, Kurdistan's presence has sent a message that it holds strategic influence over neighboring countries. According to Iran, disarming these groups would severely undermine Kurdistan's autonomy.

The displacement of Iranian Kurdish groups from the Kurdistan region could result in Turkey making a similar plea to Baghdad and Erbil regarding the PKK. This situation could prove challenging to the Shiite factions ruling federal Iraq, some of whom have sought to use their ties with the PKK as part of Iran's strategic rivalry with Turkey. If Baghdad and Erbil do not respond to this, it would likely provoke intensified Turkish raids in the region, causing further upheaval and turbulence for Iraqi Kurdistan.

Iran's demands are adamant and forceful, but Iraqi-Kurdish authorities do not appear willing to meet them at the exact scale and scope Tehran wants. Ghafouri, however, warned that the KRG should not underestimate Iranian threats, especially since Tehran has the ability to undermine stability. He concluded that Kurdistan needs to be careful and read Tehran and Baghdad's intentions carefully.